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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960814-CA 
v. : 
MICHAEL CHARLES LAYMAN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of possession 
of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) 
(Supp. 1996); driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(Supp. 1996); and possession of paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1996). 
(A copy of these statutes is attached in addendum A.) 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS QF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly admit the testimony of 
Deputy Don Decamp about testing he administered to defendant and 
about his opinion concerning the presence of stimulants or 
intoxicants in defendant's system? 
Issues involving the admissibility of evidence are reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. Salt Lake City v. Garcia. 912 P.2d 
997, 999 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). 
"The trial court has wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and this court will not 
overturn the trial court's determination unless the trial court 
exceeded its permissible range of discretion." State ex rel. G.D. 
v. L.D.. 894 P.2d 1278, 1284 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. 
Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Did the trial court properly consider the contents of 
the toxicology report which was admitted pursuant to defendant's 
stipulation? 
Where defendant challenges the weight given by the trier of 
fact to evidence admitted pursuant to the parties' stipulation, 
there is no standard of review as the apportionment of both 
weight and credibility to testimony and evidence lies exclusively 
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with the trier of fact, as does the determination of what 
inferences to draw from the credited facts. State v. Reed, 839 
P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Baaley. 681 
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984); State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 
292 (Utah 1982), cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). A trial 
court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and so 
long as the findings are not against the clear weight of the 
evidence and this court does not otherwise reach a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings will 
not be disturbed. State v. Murphy, 872 P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah 
App. 1994) . 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error where, in 
closing argument, the parties argued over the issue of 
constructive possession of contraband, and the trial court's 
ruling contains findings consistent with an intent to make a 
finding of constructive possession, but the trial court 
inappropriately used the term "common enterprise"? 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, 
and so long as the findings are not against the clear weight of 
the evidence and this court does not otherwise reach a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings 
will not be disturbed. Murphy, 872 P.2d at 481-82. Moreover, an 
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appellate court is not necessarily bound by the label attached by 
the trial judge to his or her actions. Cf. State v. Jackson. 857 
P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 1993) (trial court's label of dismissal 
or acquittal is not binding on appellate court); State v. Munsen. 
821 P.2d 13, 16 (Utah App. 1991) (trial court's distinction 
between findings of facts and conclusions of law are not 
necessarily binding on appellate court), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992). 
4. Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant's 
convictions of possession of paraphernalia and possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute? 
When reviewing a bench trial under a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court will affirm the lower court's judgment 
"unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Reed. 839 P.2d at 879 
(quoting State v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) 
(additional quotation omitted)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief. 
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STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with driving 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and 
possession of paraphernalia (R. 6-7).x Addendum A. Following a 
preliminary hearing before Judge A. Lynn Payne, defendant was 
bound over for trial on all charges (R. 53-54, 230) . Defendant 
waived a jury trial and, because Judge Payne had heard the 
preliminary hearing, requested a bench trial before Judge John R. 
Anderson (R. 38-39) . On December 10, 1996, a bench trial was 
held before Judge Anderson in which defendant presented no 
testimony (R. 67-68, 80-205). Immediately thereafter, defendant 
waived preparation of a presentence report and was sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison for a term of one-to-fifteen years for the 
second degree felony, together with concurrent terms of 6 months 
for each of the two class B misdemeanors (R. 214, 221-22). 
xThe information included a fourth claim, asserting 
forfeiture of defendant's interest in the 1970 Chevy Malibu he 
was driving at the time he was stopped (R. 6-7). The resolution 
of this claim is not apparent from this record. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of August 11, 1996, defendant Michael Charles 
Layman and his father Hobart Layman arrived in defendant's 1970 
Chevy Malibu at the home of Gina Ziegenhirt in Salt Lake City (R. 
6, 174). Hobart was going to Vernal to sell some methamphetamine 
and asked Gina to go with them, saying she could "double" her 
money (R. 175). Gina gave Hobart $500.00, and the three set out 
for Vernal with defendant driving (R. 175-76). Defendant wasn't 
speaking to Hobart and was "irritated" because Gina was going to 
come along (R. 187). However, while Hobart slept during the 
drive, Gina and defendant talked (R. 176-77). When defendant 
discovered that, like him, Gina was having child custody problems 
with the State of Utah, he became less tense (R. 189-91) . 
The three stopped in a motel in Vernal in the early morning 
hours of August 12 where Hobart divided the methamphetamine, 
complaining of the inaccuracy of the scales he was using (R. 178, 
181). Within twenty to thirty minutes of stopping, they were on 
the road again, with defendant driving, to take Hobart to another 
place in Vernal (R. 179, 182). Hobart left some of the 
methamphetamine with defendant and Gina, handing it to Gina in a 
pouch which also held the scales he'd used at the motel (R. 
6 
182) .2 Gina put the pouch inside the front waistband of her 
shorts (R. 99-100). At the same time, Hobart made arrangements 
with them to pick him up again later (R. 182, 187). 
Shortly thereafter, defendant and Gina were going southbound 
on Vernal Avenue with defendant driving (R. 86, 113, 183). It 
was just before 3:00 a.m. when he passed Deputy Shaun Abplanalp 
as the deputy was completing a turn into the northbound lanes of 
Vernal Avenue at 4000 South Vernal Avenue (R. 86, 113). Upon 
making his turn, the deputy looked in his side view mirror and 
noticed that the rear end of defendant's car had no working 
lights (R. 86, 113). The deputy turned his car around and put on 
the emergency overhead lights, intending to effect a traffic stop 
due to the unsafe condition of defendant's car (R. 86-87, 113, 
115). When the lights went on, defendant jerked his car suddenly 
to the right as if to pull off the road, then again suddenly to 
the left so that when the car stopped, it was perpendicular to 
the officer's car with the driver's door facing the officer (R. 
87, 116). Defendant immediately got out of his car and walked 
"briskly" toward the deputy's car (R. 87). Defendant appeared 
2Gina made it clear that she was there for the money only 
and not to share in the methamphetamine (R. 182-83, 186-89). She 
believed she was just holding it for Hobart (R. 187). 
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upset, and the deputy noticed as defendant got closer that his 
eyes were red, bloodshot, and "very, very watery" (R. 89, 118). 
The deputy got out to meet defendant, who became immediately 
aggressive and began demanding to know why he'd been stopped (R. 
87, 90-91). The deputy explained about the non-working lights, 
and the two walked back toward defendant's car (R. 87-88). 
Defendant gave the deputy his driver's license and the 
registration, then crawled into the trunk to embark on an 
unsuccessful attempt to fix the problem (R. 88-89) . After a 
brief conversation with defendant, the deputy approached the 
passenger, Gina, obtained her name and date of birth, then 
returned to his car to check both individuals (R. 92). He then 
returned defendant's license and registration (R. 93-94). 
The deputy had noticed that defendant appeared to be very 
anxious throughout the stop: he could not stay calm, would not 
hold still, was constantly in motion, suffered swings in his 
moods from calm to very irritated to mad and back, was extremely 
fidgety, was demanding, and had eyes that darted back and forth 
(R. 89, 91, 94-96, 120, 126). From his training and experience, 
he knew that several of these behaviors may indicate the 
ingestion of controlled substances (R, 94-96) . These 
observations, together with those the officer had noted from the 
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time he turned on his emergency overhead lights, caused the 
deputy to ask defendant about the existence of controlled 
substances, weapons, and open containers (R. 94, 97) . Defendant 
denied possessing any of those items (R. 97)• The officer then 
asked if he could check inside the car, to which defendant made a 
broad, open gesture toward the car with his arms, palms up, and 
told the deputy, "go ahead" (R. 97-98). 
The deputy had Gina get out of the car, then, for his own 
safety, did a quick pat search of each to check for weapons (R. 
98, 125). He found none on defendant, but felt something on Gina 
that prompted him to ask her to lift her shirt just above her 
waist (R. 98). She complied, and the officer saw a "black 
holster pouch" sticking up over the top of the waistband of her 
shorts about one inch (R. 98, 100). He asked if it was a weapon, 
and she said, "no" as she handed it to him (R. 101). He felt 
some hard objects in it, then gave it back and asked what was in 
it (R. 101). Gina responded that it didn't contain weapons and 
held it behind her right leg (R. 101). The deputy insisted that 
he needed to know what was inside the pouch for safety reasons, 
but Gina continued to refuse and to act "very nervous" (R. 101-
02). At one point, the officer observed her look toward 
defendant, who was at the rear of the car on the driver's side 
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four or five feet away (R. 102-03) . Following her gaze, the 
officer saw defendant shaking his head back and forth in the 
negative (R. 102-03) . The officer then asked to see the contents 
and took a step toward Gina (R. 103). She stepped back, 
continuing to look toward defendant, and asked if she was under 
arrest (R. 103-04). The officer said no, reiterated that he had 
to know the contents of the pouch for safety reasons, then took 
the pouch from her hands (R. 104). He discovered that the pouch 
contained numerous syringes (two of which had been used), a 
spoon, a large baggy of what was later identified as 
methamphetamine, and plastic scales (R. 104-08, 110). The 
officer immediately arrested Gina (R. 109, 128) . 
By this time Deputy Don Decamp and Officer Bo Faircloth had 
arrived (R. 83, 110, 122-23, 130-31). Now feeling able to focus 
his efforts without having to worry about safety concerns, and 
knowing that Deputy Decamp had both training and experience in 
drug recognition evaluation, Deputy Abplanalp asked Decamp to 
conduct field sobriety tests on defendant (R. 110, 122-23, 125, 
134) . 
Decamp had defendant perform seven sobriety tests while at 
the scene of the stop (R. 136-45, 163-67), Based on defendant's 
performance of these tests, his physical characteristics, and the 
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officer's other observations, Deputy Decamp determined that 
defendant had intoxicants in his system and was incapable of 
safely operating a car (R. 146). The physical characteristics 
the officer observed which suggested intoxicants or drugs in the 
system included "very strong eyelid tremors" readily apparent in 
two of the sobriety tests, very red glassy eyes, and, most 
importantly, an inability to remain calm and stand still: 
defendant kept clutching his hands, making fists, moving, and 
"dancing" (R. 146-47) . Decamp later conduct more extensive 
testing, commonly called drug recognition evaluation [UDRE"] at 
the jail (R. 147). The testing included a breath test--which 
registered no alcohol--and several of the tests which had been 
conducted at the scene (R. 147-48, 156-57). Decamp also noticed 
several marks from needle injections on the inside of both of 
defendant's arms, and explained in detail at the trial how he had 
been trained to recognize the difference between needle marks and 
areas that are merely red and swollen (R. 157-58). Like 
Abplanalp, Decamp also noticed defendant's red, glassy eyes (R. 
157). However, what most impressed Decamp was defendant's 
inability to remain calm in a relatively quiet situation (R. 158-
59). Defendant's hands kept moving, he couldn't stand on one 
foot very long, he rocked a lot, and he seemed very anxious and 
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fidgety (R. 158-159). Decamp also looked at defendant's pupils 
in four different light settings to help determine what drug was 
in his system, and checked his blood pressure (elevated), body 
temperature (low), and pulse (accelerated) (R. 159-62). He 
determined that neither Actifed nor any marketed cough syrup, 
which defendant claims to have been taking at the time, would 
explain any of defendant's physical or behavioral symptoms (R. 
162, 168-69). Instead, he concluded that defendant was under the 
influence of a central nervous system stimulant (R. 161). 
Deputy Abplanalp thereafter took defendant to the Ashley 
Valley Medical Center where he was present while defendant's 
blood was drawn (R. Ill, 130). During the blood draw, the 
officer noticed that defendant had wa couple of large red lumps 
near the vein area in the crotch of his arm" which appeared to be 
consistent with the use of a needle (R. Ill, 130) . 
Based on this evidence, Judge Anderson found defendant 
guilty as charged (R. 67, 205-08). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Defendant's assertion that the testimony of Deputy 
Don Decamp was inadmissible due to the State's failure to comply 
with the burden of laying a foundation for the admission of 
scientific evidence is not properly before this Court as 
12 
defendant failed to make a proper objection below to preserve the 
issue for appellate review. 
Even on its merits, his claim fails because no scientific 
evidence was adduced which required such foundation. Deputy 
Decamp's testimony did not involve scientifically-based facts or 
determinations. Instead, he testified as to his observations and 
gave his ultimate opinion based on his education, training and 
experience. Consequently, the State was not required to 
establish the specific foundation defendant complains was 
lacking. 
Point II: Defendant's request that this Court reverse his 
conviction for driving under the influence because the trial 
judge gave too much weight to the content of the toxicology 
report is without merit. It is exclusively within the 
responsibility of the trier of fact to apportion both weight and 
credibility to testimony and evidence and to determine what 
inferences to draw from the credited facts. This Court is not in 
a position to second-guess these determinations so long as the 
lower court's findings are not against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Moreover, defendant invited any error by failing to 
correct the prosecution's allegedly erroneous understanding of 
the parties' stipulation. 
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Point III: Although the trial court heard arguments from 
counsel concerning defendant's constructive possession of 
contraband, then rendered an opinion which included numerous 
findings related to a determination of constructive possession, 
the trial court inadvertently used the phrase "common enterprise" 
in lieu of "constructive possession" in rendering its ruling. 
However, reversal of defendant's convictions is not warranted 
where the underlying findings clearly relate to the required 
constructive possession determination, the evidence fully 
supports the findings, and the court's ruling does not evidence 
any intent by the court to reject the issue of constructive 
possession. Instead, this record permits this Court to correct 
the trial court's phraseology and affirm defendant's convictions 
based on his constructive possession of contraband. 
Point IV: Defendant's claim of insufficient evidence to 
support his convictions of possession of paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine should be summarily rejected by this Court 
because his attempt to marshal the evidence in support of his 
convictions is wholly inadequate. 
The claim should also be rejected should this Court address 
it on its merits. The claim turns on the sufficiency of the 
evidence to establish defendant's constructive possession of the 
14 
paraphernalia and the drugs. As established in Point III, there 
is ample evidence in the record, together with the reasonable 
inferences therefrom, to support a finding of constructive 
possession of both the paraphernalia and the methamphetamine. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO DECAMP'S TESTIMONY SHOULD BE 
REJECTED BECAUSE IT IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT; 
EVEN ON THE MERITS, HIS LEGAL ARGUMENT IS INAPPLICABLE 
TO THE FACTS AT HAND 
Defendant first challenges the admission of testimony from 
Deputy Don Decamp concerning his expertise in drug recognition 
evaluation. He claims that the trial court erroneously qualified 
Decamp as an expert and permitted him to give expert testimony 
without the foundation required for scientific testimony: 
specifically, a general acceptance of the underlying science in 
the scientific community, and inherent reliability of the tests. 
Appellant's Br. at 6-7. He faults the State for failing to 
adduce evidence to establish Decamp's qualifications beyond his 
education through Utah Peace Officer's Standards and Training, 
the qualifications of his instructors, and the scientific 
principles inherent in the process Decamp was taught. Id. at 6. 
However, defendant's claim fails for two reasons. 
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&^ This Court Need Not Reach Defendant's Claim As It Was Not 
Preserved Below And Is Not Araued On Appeal Under The 
Doctrines Of Plain Error Or Exceptional Circumstances 
First, defendant failed to preserve the issue below, and 
presents neither a plain error nor an exceptional circumstance 
argument on appeal. The testimony concerning Decamp's DRE 
experience centered around the sobriety testing the officer did 
on defendant at the jail- He had already testified to the 
sobriety tests he had administered to defendant at the scene of 
the stop, defendant's performance on those tests, and his opinion 
as to whether defendant had intoxicants in his system (R. 13 7-
46). Decamp then outlined his intensive training without 
objection from defendant (R. 148-50). It was not until after 
defendant had finished his description of his training and was 
describing his success rate on his post-training evaluations that 
defendant voiced his only objection relating to foundation: 
Q [PROSECUTOR]. In any of those [39 post-training 
evaluation] cases, deputy, have you had the ability to track 
your successful prediction rate; that is, cases where you 
would say subject so-and-so is on cocaine, subject Smith is 
under the influence of central nervous system depressant, 
then have that conclusion verified by actual chemical tests, 
intoxilyzer tests? 
[DEFENDANT]: Your Honor, I think we need some 
foundation as to what ''successful" would mean. The 
testimony that he has made is that, in his opinion, Mr. 
Layman was impaired. Presumably, that is what [the 
prosecutor] is asking. But I don't know what he means, if 
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that means that there has been a conviction, that might be -
- that might be something that would qualify. If it means 
that the presence of something was found in a person's 
system, I don't think that corroborates anything as far as 
whether or not the person is under the influence, which is 
the key issue and what the testimony of this officer was. 
So I would like - I am not saying it's impossible to lay 
the foundation, but I just don't see how we can define 
"successful" as it relates to these 3 9 times that he says 
he's done tests. 
THE COURT: Where are you going with this? 
[PROSECUTOR]: The question, Your Honor, is actually 
designed to elicit a response with respect to on how many 
occasions in this 3 9 times has there been some sort of a 
follow-up verification of whether the person, if the person 
submitted to a blood test or urine test, so that we can then 
begin to build a foundation that [defense counsel] was 
looking for; that obvious follow-up questions will be, how 
many times have your conclusions, with respect to whether a 
person has been under the influence of a particular 
substance been verified by the fact that that person did 
indeed have in their system a measure of that substance? 
THE COURT: I understand, but to what ultimate goal? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Showing his amount [sic] and accuracy, 
Your Honor, in evaluating the substance that is affecting 
any particular person. And, ultimately, the conclusion 
would be that if he were able to accurately identify the 
signs of a person being under the influence of marijuana or 
methamphetamine, or cocaine, if he reached a conclusion as 
to what this defendant was influenced by that evening, he 
could offer his opinion with respect to what that substance 
was that was affecting this defendant. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Again, my response, Your Honor, is 
there is nothing statutory. There is nothing, no way to 
measure the issue of under the influence versus any 
particular drug happening to be in the system or not. I 
don't think this witness has the expertise to say that any 
certain indication of quantity or even the presence of any 
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individual controlled substance in a person's blood 
correlates to being under the influence. And that's the 
issue. 
[PROSECUTOR]: And I think he's actually fairly accurate 
on that point, Your Honor. This particular defendant, the 
report that you have before you had, between methamphetamine 
and amphetamine, in his blood one microgram per milliliter. 
If you were to look at that in a cosmic sense of quantity, 
that's a small, small quantity. And I have tried it on 
other occasions, you are not going to get any expert to come 
into court here and say that, well, that shows a degree of 
impairment that is equivalent to a point 2-0. You might get 
someone to come in and say that's a tremendous amount or 
that's a fair amount. But it's not a science like alcohol. 
However ,the court need not wonder [sic] blindly in this 
issue of influence of drugs that one of the factors that the 
court can examine, should examine, must examine with respect 
to whether the defendant was under the influence of drugs to 
a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle, is whether the signs of that drug use were 
sufficiently manifest that they could be evaluated by a drug 
recognition evaluator. And that's where we are headed. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to view this, I 
guess, as a question of weight as well. But with the 
admonition that I am wondering where you were going, I'll 
overrule the objection and allow you to continue. 
(R. 151-54) .3 (A copy of the relevant transcript pages is 
attached in addendum B.) Decamp went on to testify that 3 5 of 
the 39 cases were submitted for toxicological testing, and all 35 
3Once the officer testified about his post-certification 
success rate, defendant made an "objection" to clarify the 
substance of the testimony and ensure the court considered the 
testimony appropriately (R. 155-56) . Addendum B. 
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verified Decamp's opinion that each of the accuseds had a 
controlled substance in his system (R. 154). 
The objection put to the court by defendant goes to the 
narrow issue of the admissibility of Decamp's post-training, on-
the-job success rate based on the definition of "successful." It 
does not bring to the trial court's attention any concern for the 
adequacy of the foundation regarding his training and 
certification- Defendant was concerned that the witness would be 
permitted to testify that he could determine either the quantity 
or the particular substance present in an individual's system 
and, based on that determination, declare the person legally 
under the influence. This objection does not challenge the 
acceptance of the witness' training in the scientific community 
or the inherent reliability of his techniques, as defendant 
argues on appeal. Absent a specific objection placing the issue 
before the trial court, and absent plain error or exceptional 
circumstances arguments on direct appeal, this Court should not 
reach the merits of defendant's claim of error. State v. 
Range1, 866 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to reach the 
merits of issues where the objections in the trial court "were 
not specific enough to properly raise and preserve [defendant's 
claims of error] for appeal"); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 361 
19 
(Utah App. 1993) (refusing to reach the merits of an issue, in 
part, because defendant did not "bring to the trial court's 
conscious awareness or attention" the errors he claims on 
appeal); State v. Blubauah. 904 P.2d 688, 700-01 (Utah App. 1995) 
(refusing to reach a claim not raised at trial where defendant 
failed to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances 
on appeal), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
E^ On Its Merits. The Foundational Requirements For Scientific 
Evidence Are Inapplicable Where The Challenged Testimony Was 
Neither Presented Nor Considered As Scientific Evidence 
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's claim, it 
will find that the law cited by defendant is inapplicable to the 
testimony at hand. Defendant argues that Decamp's testimony was 
inadmissible because it lacked the foundation required in this 
jurisdiction for admission of scientific evidence under State v. 
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 400-04 (Utah 1989). Appellant's Br. at 
6-7. 
However, where a witness offers opinions based on expertise 
arising solely from training, experience and personal 
observations, and the court does not view the evidence as being 
scientifically based, the foundational requirements set forth in 
Rimmasch have no application. See Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 
P.2d 997, 1000-01 (Utah App.) (upholding the admission of 
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testimony concerning field sobriety testing without the 
foundation required for scientifically-based testimony where the 
administering officer testified based on his training and 
experience, the trial court did not admit the testimony as 
scientific evidence, and the jury was specifically instructed not 
to consider the testimony to be scientific evidence), cert. 
denied. 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). £g£ i^ L, at 1001 (Bench, J.,' 
concurring) ("As indicated in the main opinion, the HGN 
[Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus] testimony was not admitted as 
scientific evidence. The foundational requirements discussed in 
State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) are therefore not 
applicable." (citing State ex rel. G.D. v. L.D., 894 P.2d 1278, 
1284 (Utah App. 1995)). 
In this case, the Rimmasch foundational requirements are 
inapplicable because Decamp's testimony did not involve 
scientific evidence, and he was not qualified by the State as an 
expert to give scientifically-based evidence. Instead, Decamp 
testified as an expert based on his personal observations, 
training, and experience. As non-scientific, first-hand 
observations, his expert opinion was admissible without requiring 
the foundation set forth in Rimmasch for the admission of 
scientific evidence. See State ex rel. G.D.. 894 P.2d at 1284 
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(the trial court Mid not exceed its permissible range of 
discretion" by admitting expert testimony without entertaining a 
full Rimmasch analysis "as there was no scientific process on 
which to apply such an analysis"); see also Garcia. 912 P.2d at 
1000-01. 
Deputy Decamp explained in detail the tests he gave 
defendant, both at the scene of the initial stop and subsequently 
at the jail, and his observations of defendant's attempts to 
perform each test or otherwise respond to the officer's 
directions (R. 137-48, 156-60). He then gave his expert opinion, 
expressly basing it on his observations, defendant's performance, 
the observed physical characteristics, and defendant's mannerisms 
and appearance (R. 145-46, 161). When describing some of the 
factors giving rise to his opinion, Decamp couched his remarks in 
terms of each factor suggesting the presence of a stimulant in 
the system, being "associated with" the existence of intoxicants, 
or indicating the presence of drugs: he did not testify that any 
of the factors he observed in fact established, by any means, 
that defendant was under the influence (R. 141, 146, 160). In 
laying the foundation for his testimony concerning the testing at 
the jail, Decamp explained his training, the high standards 
required before certification in drug recognition, his ultimate 
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certification, then launched into his post-training experience 
(R. 14 8-51). He explained the extent of his observations and 
evaluations of intoxicated individuals, his observations in 
controlled and uncontrolled situations, and his post-
certification success rate at being able to determine whether any 
intoxicant is present in a given individual (R. 149-51, 154-55). 
His testimony did not suggest the existence or use of 
scientifically-based.facts or determinations. There was no 
testimony that any physical characteristics are scientifically 
accepted to establish a particular level of impairment. In fact, 
defendant went out of his way to ensure that the trial court did 
not interpret the testimony in just that way by lodging the 
objections noted above. Even Decamp's opinion that Actifed and 
cough syrup would not likely explain defendant's physical or 
behavioral symptoms was based on his general familiarity with the 
general reactions derived from such substances, not from any 
scientific process or analysis (R. 160-62). 
Not only did the witness' testimony stay within the bounds 
of non-scientific opinion testimony, but the trial court 
explained that it would consider the testimony in just that 
light: in response to defendant's concern that the court would 
understand the testimony to suggest that the witness was able to 
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somehow determine when and to what degree an individual was 
legally impaired as verified by subsequent drug tests, the court 
responded, "Well, I am not viewing that as a 35 out of 35 
indication of impairment . . . . I am understanding that to be 
that of the 35 cases that he suspected a controlled substance, 
the blood test validated his opinion" (R. 155). Addendum B. The 
trial judge thereby expressed his intent to properly limit the 
weight of Decamp's testimony, considering it as a trained expert 
opinion but not one involving scientific determinations or 
pinpoint accuracy. 
Because Decamp's opinion was not scientifically based, the 
foundational requirements of Rimmasch have no application, and 
defendant's claim is without merit. 
POINT II 
ON THIS RECORD, THE TRIAL COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OF 
WEIGHT TO THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT--ADMITTED BY 
STIPULATION OF BOTH PARTIES--DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously gave 
weight to the content of the State crime lab toxicology report 
submitted pursuant to the parties' stipulation. Appellant's Br. 
at 9. He argues that because the State presented no evidence 
concerning who drew his blood or how it was taken, pursuant to 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) (Supp. 1996), the results 
reflected in the report "are inadequate" and "should have been 
given no value." Id. at 8-9. 
Immediately before the first witness was called at trial, 
the prosecutor informed the court that the parties had agreed 
that the witnesses from the toxicology laboratory and the state 
crime laboratory need not testify at trial and that both parties 
stipulated to admission of the reports from both laboratories (R. 
84-85) (a copy of the oral stipulation is attached in addendum 
C). Defendant "agreed that the reports can be used in lieu of 
testimony of them" (R. 84). Addendum C. 
During the State's case-in-chief, Deputy Abplanalp testified 
that he took the defendant to the Ashley Valley Medical Center 
for the blood draw and that he was present during the draw (R. 
Ill, 130). Nothing more was said concerning the blood draw or 
the testing until closing arguments. At that point, defendant 
broached the subject, saying: 
. . . [T]he State, I am sure, is going to say that the 
lab report, Exhibit No. 1, is indicative of Mr. Layman's 
knowledge in some way and somehow [may] be inferred to put 
him in possession of the controlled substanpe, which is the 
subject of this. 
Now, at the preliminary hearing, the State expressly 
waived any theory about possession of controlled substance 
in a person's system as being a crime. That theory has been 
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treated in dicta at the appellate court level. And [the 
prosecutor's office] chose not to even pursue it on that 
theory and that's expressly on the record. 
So, a nodded head and a lab report. Well, the lab 
report, I stipulated to its admissibility. But the lab 
report is based on a blood draw as such was the testimony 
before the court. I would suggest to the court that while I 
stipulated to admissibility, there are certain foundational 
requirements for admissibility which are there for a reason. 
It is a foundational requirement for a blood draw on a DUI 
that the blood be taken by a qualified person, and then [the 
statute] defines a qualified person as being a medical 
doctor, a registered nurse, or someone who has otherwise 
been qualified by the State for the purpose of drawing 
blood. 
In this case, we have nothing before the court saying 
who drew the blood, what the preparation was, what the state 
of the needle was, what the anything [sic] that would relate 
to excluding impurities to insure that the results which 
were reached at the State lab have any degree of accuracy 
whatsoever. There is no testimony. 
Now, while I may have some idea based on discovery 
materials, who did a blood draw, the court can't speculate. 
And the State has not met its burden of showing that this is 
reliable evidence that can be relied upon when we talk about 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, I would suggest 
to the court that the weight to be given anything in that 
blood draw is nonexistent or, at least, minimal. 
(R. 194-96) . Addendum C. 
In rendering his decision, the trial judge made the 
following comments: 
. . . I do have a toxicology report that came in 
showing there was methamphetamine and a lot of 
methamphetamine in the bloodstream. I suppose there had to 
be evidence that there was a qualified technician that drew 
the blood in order to convict for a DUI. Again, that's a 
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matter of weight. I assume that the evidence was the blood 
was drawn at the Ashley Valley Medical Center,4 They 
probably wouldn't have the janitor do it. So I guess as a 
matter of weight I am not going to find that's totally 
defective and probably within the reasonable contemplation 
of the stipulation anyway. 
(R. 205-06) (footnote added). Addendum C. 
Having stipulated to the admission of the toxicology report, 
defendant cannot challenge that admission on appeal. Instead, he 
challenges the trial court's consideration of the evidence. 
Defendant does not claim that the samples used to generate the 
report were contaminated or improperly drawn, but merely points 
to the absence of testimony establishing the foundation for 
admission of such evidence, then argues that, absent such 
foundational testimony, the trial court should accord the report 
no weight. Appellant's Br. at 8-9. This Court should reject his 
argument on either of two bases. 
First, defendant's claim should be rejected'because he 
invited the error from which he now appeals. Based on the 
stipulation entered into with defense counsel, the prosecutor 
filed his witness list with the Court on December 9, 1996 (R. 63-
64) (a copy is included in addendum C). In it, the prosecutor 
4This was in fact the evidence as testified to by Deputy 
Abplanalp (R. Ill). 
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explains, "Relying on the representations of counsel, the State 
will not call criminalists, toxicologists or other technical 
witnesses with respect to the testing of defendant's bodily 
fluids and the suspected controlled substances sought to be 
introduced at trial" (R. 63-64). Addendum C. Defendant made no 
attempt to correct the prosecutor's interpretation of the 
stipulation but permitted the State to present its evidence and 
rest its case before pointing out to the trial court defendant's 
different view of the stipulation. Accordingly, defendant is not 
entitled to relief on appeal based on this claim of error. See 
State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d 112, 117 (Utah App. 1994) (even 
assuming error, defendant was not entitled to relief where he 
invited the error through his own actions). 
Second, this Court should reject defendant's attempt to have 
it dictate the weight to be given properly admitted evidence 
because it is outside the province of appellate courts to 
determine the weight or degree of credibility to be given to 
testimony or other evidence. See State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 54 0, 
544 (Utah 1994); State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 
1982), nert. denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983); State v. Wilkerson. 
612 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. Johnson. 18 Utah 2d 16, 
414 P.2d 575, 578 (1966) . Moreover, if defendant wished to limit 
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the weight attributed the report by the trier of fact, he had 
some burden to put before the court something other than mere 
speculation, especially where he actively placed the evidence 
before the trier of fact in the first place. £££, e.g., Taylor. 
414 P.2d at 578; see also State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 481 
(Utah 1990) (to assist the trier of fact in apportioning weight 
and reliability to test results testified to by an expert who did 
not conduct the test., uit is incumbent upon the defense to cross-
examine the expert as to his contacts with the test procedures 
and the reliability of the procedures,"). Defendant instead 
chose simply to argue to the court in closing that the State 
presented no direct evidence relating to the procedures followed 
in drawing the blood. Hence, the Court apparently had before it 
the information defendant felt was necessary to enable the court 
to determine that the toxicology report warranted no 
consideration. That the court instead chose to reject 
defendant's argument and to apportion some weight to the report 
in making its ultimate determination of guilt is within the trier 
of fact's responsibility. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d at 292. 
Further, there is nothing in the record which suggests that 
the lower court's decision to consider the toxicology report is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Murphy. 872 
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P.2d 480, 481-82 (Utah App. 1994). When the court was presented 
with the parties' stipulation for admission of the reports, there 
was no reservation of foundational issues, justifying the lower 
court in concluding that the scope of the stipulation reasonably 
included a determination by the parties that the foundational 
issues normally required to be addressed prior to a determination 
of admissibility were uncontested. Not only was the 
admissibility of the report stipulated by the parties, but the 
State established that the blood was drawn at the Ashley Valley 
Medical Center in the presence of a trained officer (R. Ill, 
130). These points suggest a proper blood draw and support the 
trial court's decision to accord the toxicology report some 
weight. On this record, and without any evidence raising a 
question as to the propriety of the blood draw, the trial court's 
decision to credit the report is not clear error, and defendant's 
claim should be rejected. 
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POINT III 
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY USED THE 
PHRASE "COMMON ENTERPRISE" IN RENDERING ITS RULING ON 
THE POSSESSION CHARGES, THE UNDERLYING FINDINGS AND THE 
ENTIRETY OF THE RULING ESTABLISH THAT THE COURT 
ESSENTIALLY FOUND CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE 
CONTRABAND, THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THAT 
DETERMINATION, AND THAT THE COURT SIMPLY USED IN 
INAPPROPRIATE LABEL IN RENDERING ITS DECISION 
In their closing arguments, both counsel recognized that the 
evidence showed that defendant was not in actual possession of 
the contraband. Recognizing that the court would, therefore, 
have to make a finding on the issue of constructive possession, 
State v. fialaa. 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991), both 
counsel presented arguments for or against that issue based on 
the evidence before the court (R. 193-94, 200-05). The trial 
judge thereafter ruled as follows concerning the possession 
charges: 
Count 2 [and 3], that's a harder case for me. I guess 
my finding there is that this defendant was involved in a 
common enterprise. From the testimony that I have heard 
here, whether he had contributed cash or vehicle or acted as 
the driver, they all had a common mission in coming to 
Y^ rjial, and that taken together with his dominion, with his 
involvement in the trip, with his possession of it in the 
motel room, with his apparent dominion nf it. even though 
this witness, this other witness testified that she was 
given the meth to hold by Hobart, she was hesitant to 
testify here that this defendant had an interest in it. But 
I think it's obvious from the -joint enterprise they were on 
that he. in fact, had an interest in it. The quantity was a 
distribution quantity. That taken together with the scales 
31 
and the paraphernalia, I don't know, I guess the 
paraphernalia, the only evidence of this is evidence that 
the defendant had used both, again, from the toxicology 
report, the blood test, and the observations of the officers 
who were trained and [sic] identifying people whoever's high 
on speed, convince me that the paraphernalia w^g actually, 
probably, beyond a reasonable doubt used by Layman on this 
evening. I find him guilty on all counts and beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard. 
(R. 207-08) (emphasis added).5 (A copy of the court's entire 
ruling is attached in addendum D.) 
On appeal, both defendant and the State agree that both 
charges involving possession of contraband must arise from 
defendant's constructive possession of the drugs and 
paraphernalia. However, in Point IV of defendant's brief6, he 
looks at the trial court's use of the term "common enterprise" in 
5The emphasis in the quoted ruling highlights the trial 
court's findings which relate to the constructive possession 
argument advanced in the remainder of Point III. 
6Point III of defendant's brief asserts that the trial 
court's reliance on a common enterprise theory establishes that 
the court found Gina Ziegenhirt to be an incredible witness, then 
inappropriately took her testimony and gave substantive weight to 
the opposite of what she said, thereby resulting in defendant's 
possession convictions. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. The trial 
court essentially stated that despite Gina's testimony, the 
evidence showed that defendant had an interest in the contraband 
(R. 207-08), and the State's response to Point IV of defendant's 
brief--urging this Court to uphold the convictions based on the 
trial court's ruling and the record evidence--essentially answers 
the meritless contention advanced by defendant's third point. 
Consequently, the State does not separately address Point III of 
defendant's brief. 
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its ruling and contends not only that the use of a "common 
enterprise" theory is inappropriate, but that the court's failure 
to make any findings regarding constructive possession requires 
reversal of his convictions. Appellant's Br, at 12-13.7 
However, reversal of the convictions is not warranted in this 
case where the lower court's ruling demonstrates not only that 
the court did not intend to reject the constructive possession 
concept, but that the court intended to find constructive 
possession and simply attached an inappropriate label to his 
ruling. 
Constructive possession requires a finding of "a sufficient 
nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference 
that the accused had both the power and intent to exercise 
dominion or control over the drug." Salas. 820 P.2d at 13 88 
(citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)). In Fox, 
the court specified that ''evidence supporting the theory of 
'constructive possession' must raise a reasonable inference that 
the defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply 
7Defendant argues the insufficiency of the evidence to 
support a determination of constructive possession in Point V of 
his brief. Appellant's Br. at 14-17. For obvious reasons, the 
State includes in Point III above a recitation of the evidence 
supporting the constructive possession determination. 
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a bystander." 709 P.2d at 320. The inference can arise from 
circumstantial evidence so long as the guilty verdict is beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Carlson. 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). 
A number of factors have been identified as contributing, in 
some combination, to an inference of constructive possession, 
including: 1) incriminating statements or behavior on the part of 
the accused; 2) presence of the drug or paraphernalia in a place 
over which the accused has special control; and 3) defendant's 
use of drugs. Fox. 709 P.2d at 319; Salas. 820 P.2d at 1388. Any 
single factor may not support a finding of constructive 
possession. See Salas. 820 P.2d at 1388 (mere occupancy, 
especially non-exclusive occupancy, of the premises upon which 
the drugs are found does not establish the requisite nexus for a 
constructive possession determination). However, in this case, 
all three factors are clearly present and combine to support a 
determination that the requisite nexus existed to establish 
constructive possession. Moreover, the trial court recognized 
the presence of these factors by making findings on these points. 
The trial judge acknowledged defendant's incriminating 
behavior by noting his contribution of his own car and his 
driving abilities to get Gina, Hobart and the drugs to Vernal (R. 
6, 174-76, 179, 182, 207-08). From Gina's testimony, it is clear 
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that the entire purpose of the trip to her home, then to Vernal, 
was the sale of the methamphetamine, which the trial judge noted 
(R. 175-76, 178-82, 186-89, 207-08). The court found that 
defendant had apparent dominion of the contraband, referencing 
the trio's stop in a motel room in Vernal where the drugs were 
openly weighed and divided, as well as Hobart's act of openly 
handing a large quantity of the drugs to Gina when defendant 
dropped him off and made arrangements to pick him up later (R. 
178-83, 207-08). In fact, nothing in the record suggests that 
defendant's participation as driver was involuntary in any way or 
that the actions of the others were veiled so that defendant was 
deceived into innocently driving the other two on their drug 
business. 
Deputy Abplanalp's testimony established additional 
incriminating behavior. He explained that while he was trying to 
discover what was in the pouch he found in the waistband of 
Gina's pants, defendant was standing at the rear of the car four 
to five feet away (R. 101-02) . Although there was no verbal 
exchange between defendant and Gina at the time, a very nervous 
Gina repeatedly refused to relinquish the pouch1to the deputy or 
to tell him what was in it, then looked toward defendant while 
the deputy continued to ask her questions about the contents of 
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the pouch (R. 101-03). Looking in the same direction, the deputy 
saw defendant "shaking his head in a negative fashion back and 
forth/' pursuant to which Gina continued to refuse to answer the 
deputy's questions and continued to look toward defendant as if 
for guidance (R. 102-03). Such conduct by defendant reasonably 
suggests that he knew the contents of the pouch and the 
consequences which would result should the officer discover them. 
It also reasonably suggests that Gina was looking to defendant 
for answers as to what she should do or say because he had some 
control over the trip and the drugs and some decision-making 
power over her actions regarding the drugs. 
The presence of the contraband in a place over which the 
accused has special control was recognized by the trial court in 
its findings that defendant was not only involved in the trip, 
but had contributed his car, had used the paraphernalia and 
drugs, had dominion over the contraband, and had an interest in 
it (R. 207-08). The contraband was in defendant's car throughout 
the trip, except while the three were in the motel room to divide 
the drugs, and defendant never relinquished his control over the 
car. In fact, Hobart's decision to hand the pouch to Gina 
instead of defendant when he was dropped off in Vernal may 
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reasonably reflect the fact that defendant was driving, not the 
fact that defendant had no involvement with the drugs. 
I 
Defendant's knowledge of and involvement with the drugs and 
his knowing participation in the trip is solidified by the trial 
court's finding of the third factor: defendant had ua lot of" 
the drugs in his system when stopped after dropping off Hobart 
(R. 205-06). In concluding that defendant had used the 
contraband, the trial judge relied on the toxicology report, the 
blood test, and the testimony of both officers (R. 207-08). 
While the toxicology report has not been made part of the record 
on appeal, the court's ruling reflects that the report showed the 
existence of ua lot of methamphetamine" in defendant's system (R. 
205-06), and the prosecutor represented that defendant had "one 
microgram per milliliter" of methamphetamine in his blood (R. 
153). The officers testified about the observations and factors 
which led them to conclude that defendant was impaired or under 
the influence of drugs (R. 89, 91, 94-96, 120, 126, 136-48, 156-
59, 161, 163-67; and Point I, supra). They also testified that 
defendant had several needle marks on his arms consistent with 
intravenous injection of the methamphetamine found in his system, 
and that the pouch retrieved from Gina contained several 
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syringes, two of which had been used (R. 104-08, 130, 157-58, 
205-06) . 
From the findings contained in the trial court's ruling, it 
is clear that the trial judge recognized "that the defendant was 
engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander." 
Fox, 709 P.2d at 320. The content of the ruling and the numerous 
findings all grounded in record evidence suggest that the judge's 
use of the phrase "common enterprise" was simply an unfortunate 
choice of words which, apparently by accident and not by design, 
constitutes a term of art applied in this jurisdiction only in a 
business context. See Ball v. Volken. 741 P.2d 958 (Utah 1987); 
Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley. 667 P.2d 15 (Utah 1983); 
Zion's First Nat'l Bank v. Fennemore. 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); 
Smith & Edwards v. Golden Spike Little League. 577 P.2d 132 (Utah 
1978). 
Based on the trial court's findings, which have ample 
support in the record and are geared toward a determination of 
constructive possession, this Court should disregard the trial 
judge's unfortunate use of the phrase "common enterprise" and 
affirm defendant's convictions for possession of contraband based 
on his constructive possession of both the drugs and the 
paraphernalia. Cf. State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 
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1993) (looking beyond the label attached by the trial court to 
the substance of the court's action to decide appropriate posture 
of case). 
POINT IV 
THE RECORD EVIDENCE AND THE REASONABLE INFERENCES 
ARISING THEREFROM ARE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE DRUGS AND 
THE PARAPHERNALIA AND TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING OF AN INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 
In Point V of his brief, defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
paraphernalia. Appellant's Br. at 14-17. He argues that the 
conviction requires a finding of constructive possession, that 
the facts of this case do not support such a finding, and that 
the trial court Mid not find constructive possession" from the 
facts before it. Id. However, defendant's claim fails for two 
reasons. 
&*. This Court Should Net Reach Defendant's Claim Of 
Insufficiency Because He Fails To Adequately Marshal The 
Evidence In Support Of His Convictions 
In order to establish a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of 
the ruling below and demonstrate that, even viewed in a light 
most favorable to the lower court, the evidence is insufficient 
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to support the ruling. State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 819 (Utah 
App. 1994); State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah App. 
1994). The marshaling requirement applies to bench trials as 
well as to jury trials. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 
App. 1990) . 
Although defendant purports to marshal the evidence, he 
mentions only a fraction of the evidence in the three sentences 
he presents in his opening paragraph and the three he includes 
near the end of his argument. Appellant's Br. at 14, 16-17. His 
dry recitation of what was before the trial court does not 
include the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence 
as required by West VfrUey City v.t Majestic InvT CQ,, 818 P.2d 
1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). He also limits his recitation to 
facts occurring at or after the traffic stop by Deputy Abplanalp. 
Consequently, his argument includes none of the pre-stop facts, 
such as the fact that defendant drove the parties to Vernal in 
his car for the sole purpose of conducting what was apparently 
intended to be a very lucrative sale of methamphetamine (R. 6, 
175-76, 187-88), or the fact that the drugs were openly weighed 
and divided while the three were stopped at a motel for that very 
purpose (R. 178-82). Defendant mentions that uthere was a test 
showing controlled substances and/or metabolite in the 
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defendant's blood[,]" (Appellant's Br. at 14), but fails to 
acknowledge that the court noted "there was methamphetamine and a 
lot of methamphetamine" in defendant's bloodstream (R. 205-06), 
that defendant's performance on the testing he was given at the 
scene of the stop and again at the jail suggested to a trained 
officer an impairment from "a central nervous system stimulant" 
(R. 146, 161), that the paraphernalia in the pouch contained two 
"used" syringes (R. 107-08), and that two officers testified to 
the existence of several "needle injection marks" on defendant's 
arms that were consistent with intravenous injection of the drugs 
in his system, with one officer describing what he saw as being 
consistent with "fresher or new scars" (R. Ill, 130, 157-58). 
Because defendant has failed to comply with the marshaling 
requirement, this Court should not consider his sufficiency 
challenge. Pilling, 875 P.2d at 608; Moore. 802 P.2d at 739. 
B^ Qn The Merits Defendant's Claim Fails Because The Evidence 
Amply Supports His Convictions 
Should this Court view the merits of defendant's challenge, 
it will find that the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to 
be drawn therefrom, amply support the trial court's determination 
of guilt on the two challenged charges. 
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When reviewing a bench trial under a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court will affirm the lower court's judgment 
"unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Reed. 839 
P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting State v. Goodman. 763 
P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988) (additional quotation omitted)). 
As defendant recognizes, this issue turns on the sufficiency 
of the evidence to establish his constructive possession of the 
paraphernalia and the drugs. Appellant's Br. at 14. A 
conviction for possession of paraphernalia requires proof of 
possession, for use or intended use, of drug paraphernalia as 
defined in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 (1996). Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37a-5(l) (1996).8 This element may be established by a 
finding of constructive possession, and the evidence in this 
case, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, is sufficient to 
warrant such a finding. See Point III, supra. 
A conviction for possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute requires proof of two elements: 1) knowing 
and intentional possession of a controlled substance; and 2) an 
8Defendant does not claim that the items found in the pouch 
do not constitute paraphernalia as defined by statute. 
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intent to distribute it to another. State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 
318 (Utah 1985). Again, the first element may be established by 
a finding of constructive possession, which finding has ample 
support in this record. See Point III, £UE£&. Although it is 
not challenged by defendant, the second element may be inferred 
where an accused is found to be in possession of a controlled 
substance "in a quantity too large for personal consumption[.]" 
Fox. 709 P.2d at 320 (citing State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258, 
1262 (Utah 1983)). The evidence here, acknowledged by the trial 
court, was that the quantity seized in this case was a 
distribution quantity far in excess of what would normally be 
found had it been intended for personal use, and the packaging 
was highly indicative of an intent to distribute (R. 191-93, 200, 
207-08).9 Because the evidence in this matter is sufficient to 
establish defendant's constructive possession of both the drugs 
and the paraphernalia, and supports the trial court's finding of 
an intent to distribute, defendant's convictions are not against 
the clear weight of the evidence and should be affirmed by this 
Court. See Reed. 839 P.2d at 879. 
9In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the 
officers seized more than fifty times the normal user amount of 
methamphetamine from defendant and Gina (R. 200). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^ £ " day of July, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
41-6-44 MOTOR VEHICLES 126 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLR. — Operation of mopeds and motor- vehicles as within scope of driving while intoxi-
ized recreational two-, three-, and four-wheeled cated statutes, 32 A.L.R.5th 669. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reck-
less driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. 815; 
(b) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
' (b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
' (c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) 
is guilty of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor, or 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, or 
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time 
of the offense. 
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(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not 
less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700, but not more than $1,000. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, the court may 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours 
nor more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not 
less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800, but not more than $1,000. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii); and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after 
April 23,1990; or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after 
July 1, 1996. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (aXi) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $2,000, but not more than $5,000 and 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more 
than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters 
in writing on the record the reason it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may 
be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if 
the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and 
long-term closely supervised follow-through after the treatment. 
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(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(c) Under Subsection (aXii) if the court suspends the execution of a 
prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 hours; and 
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol 
or drug dependency rehabilitation program providing intensive care 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment. 
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section 
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked 
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, 
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after 
July 1,1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilita-
tion costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction 
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner 
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed 
after July 1, 1993. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility; or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 under Subsec-
tion (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render 
in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subse-
quent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted 
under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
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original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 entered under this subsection. 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation 
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended 
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
subsection, the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division 
of the Department of Public Safety an order to suspend or revoke that 
person's driving privileges for a specified period of time. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 62, ft 34; C. 1943, The 1994 amendment by ch. 263, effective 
67-7-111; L. 1849, ch. 66, ft 1; 1967, ch. 76, May 2, 1994, subdivided Subsection (12Xa), 
ft 1; 1967, ch. 88, ft 2; 1969, ch. 107, ft 2; 1977, substituted "63-3-223" for "41-2-130* in Subseo-
ch. 268, ft 3; 1979, ch. 243, ft 1; 1981, ch. 63, tion (12Xb), and made stylistic changes. 
ft 2; 1982, ch. 46, ft 1; 1983, ch. 99, ft 13; 1983, The 1996 amendment by ch. 220, effective 
ch.l03,ft 1; 1983, ch. 183, ft 33; 1986, ch. 46, April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsections 
ft 1; 1986, ch. 122, ft 1; 1986, ch. 178, ft 29; (6Xb) and (7) concerning punishments for third 
1987, ch. 138, ft 37; 1987 (1st 8J5L), ch. 8, ft 2; and fourth convictions of driving under the 
1988, ch. 17, ft 1; 1990, ch. 183, ft 16; 1990, influence; added Subsections (6XaXU) and (6Xc) 
ch. 299, ft 1; 1991, ch. 147, ft 1; 1993, ch. 168, making related redesignation and reference 
ft 1; 1993, ch. 193, ft 1; 1993, ch. 234, ft 32; changes; in Subsection (6Xa) added "or subse-
1994, ch. 169, ft 1; 1994, ch. 263, ft 1; 1996, quent"; in Subsection (6XaXi) substituted -class 
ch. 71, ft 1; 1996, ch. 220, ft 1; 1996, ch. 223, A* for "class B"; and made stylistic changes. 
ft 2. The 1996 amendment by ch. 71, effective July 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- 1, 1996, added Subsections UXa) and (13); 
ment by ch. 159, effective March 17, 1994, redesignated former Subsection (1) as (2Xa) 
added Subsection (3XaXiiXB), making related and (2Kb) and former Subsection (2) as (2Xc); 
changes, and substituted "Section 53-3-223" for revised and redesignated former Subsections 
"41-2-130" in Subsection (12Xb). (3Xb) and (3Xc) as Subsections (1Kb) and (1XO; 
68-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 88 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection shall be deposited in 
the General Fund. 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit information to the 
database as required under this section after the division has submitted a 
specific written request for the information or when the division deter-
, mines the individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit the 
information as required is grounds for the division to take the following 
factions in accordance with Section 58-1-401: 
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the individual; 
(v) issue a cease an<} desist order; and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each 
dispensed prescription regarding which the required information is 
not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (aXvi) shall be deposited 
in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this subsection 
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative 
proceedings within the division. 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the database in 
accordance with this section may not be held civilly liable for having submitted 
the information. 
U4) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to establish and 
operate the database shall be funded by appropriations from the General 
(b) Funding for this section shall bp appropriated without the use of any 
resource? within the Commerce Service Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in 
this section shall b? assumed by the submitting drug outlet. 
HUtory: C. 1953, 58-377.5, enacted by L. (IXe) substituted -68-17a-102' for "68-17-2" 
1995, cb. 333, ft 3; 1996, ch. 247,9 44. and in Subsection (8Xt) added "and' at the end. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Croat-Reference*. — Sentencing for felo-
ment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection niet, (ft 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
68-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
U) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
' distribute. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (lXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
i (i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
'his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
< building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed frpm those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub- , 
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "minor1* as defined in Section 
78-3a-103, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: (i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional^mcility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through 
(2XaXvii)is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter, 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
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a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5Xb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center, 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(via) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
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would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Kb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to Va the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection 
supersedes Section 77-18-4. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
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(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9Xa) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb). 
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section 76-3-203.5. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
— for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145,ft 8; 1972, ch. 22, ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. SO, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
f 1; 1977, ch. 29, * 6; 1979, ch. 12, ft 5; 1985, ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, ft 7; 1995, ch. 284, ft 1; 
eh. 146, ft 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch. 92, 1996, ch. 1, ft 8. 
I 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 95, ft 1; Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amend-
1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch. 56, ft 1; 1989, ch. ment, effective January 31, 1996, substituted 
178, ft 1; 1989, ch. 187, ft 2; 1989, ch. 201, ft 1; -minor" for "child" and "78-3a-103" for "78-3a-2" 
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990, in Subsection <2XaXv). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 12 (Utah 1996). 
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History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 4. 
Cross-References. — Expert witnesses, 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 et seq. 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 6. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
act" means Laws 1981, ch. 76, §§ 1 to 6, which 
enacted §§ 58-37a-l to 58-37a-6. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Intent. 
Search and seizure. 
Cited. 
Intent. 
Where the buyer of drug paraphernalia only 
intended to use the items as evidence in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution of the seller, it 
was factually and legally impossible for the 
defendant to have known that items sold would 
be used for illegal purposes. State v. Murphy, 
674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1983). 
Search and seizure. 
The smell of marijuana emanating from a 
private residence provides law enforcement of-
ficials with probable cause to conduct a search 
of the premises. State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Although the plain smell doctrine provides 
officers probable cause to believe contraband or 
evidence of a crime may be found, it does not 
automatically provide officers with exigent cir-
cumstances justifying a warrantless search of a 
private residence. State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights. 
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right 
can exist in it. 
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Q SUBSEQUENT TO YOUR CERTIFICATION, HAVE YOU 
PERFORMED OTHER DRUG RECOGNITION EVALUATIONS? 
A YES, I HAVE. 
Q CAN YOU GIVE US A FIGURE, HAVE YOU KEPT TRACK OF 
HOW MANY? 
A I HAVE KEPT TRACK. I AM SORRY. I DIDN'T BRING MY 
BOOK. I BELIEVE I HAVE COMPLETED 39 OF THEM NOW. 
Q ; IN ANY OF THOSE CASES, DEPUTY, HAVE YOU HAD THE 
ABILITY TO TRACK .YOUR SUCCESSFUL PREDICTION RATE; THAT IS, 
CASES WHERE YOU WOULD SAY SUBJECT SO-AND-SO IS ON COCAINE, 
SUBJECT SMITH IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM 
DEPRESSANT, THEN HAVE THAT CONCLUSION VERIFIED BY ACTUAL 
CHEMICAL TESTS, INTOXILYZER TESTS? 
C^r MR. WILLIAMS: YOUR HONOR, I THINK WE NEED SOME 
FOUNDATION AS TO WHAT "SUCCESSFUL" WOULD MEAN. THE TESTIMONY 
THAT HE HAS MADE IS THAT, IN HIS OPINION, MR. LAYMAN WAS 
IMPAIRED. PRESUMABLY, THAT IS WHAT MR. WALLENTINE IS ASKING. 
BUT I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE MEANS, IF THAT MEANS THAT THERE HAS 
BEEN A CONVICTION, THAT MIGHT BE -- THAT MIGHT BE SOMETHING 
THAT WOULD QUALIFY. IF IT MEANS THAT THE PRESENCE OF 
SOMETHING WAS FOUND IN A PERSON'S SYSTEM, I^gON^-THlNK THAT-
CORROBORATES ANYTHING AS, _EAR-AS-WHETHER OR WOT THK PERSONETS 
UNDER TjjE-INFLUENCE, WHICH IS THE KEY ISSUE AND WHAT THE 
TESTIMONY OF THIS OFFICER WAS. SO I WOULD LIKE -- I AM NOT 
SAYING IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO LAY THE FOUNDATION, BUT I JUST DON'T 
72 
\s\ 
SEE HOW WE CAN DEFINE "SUCCESSFUL" AS IT RELATES TO THESE 39 
TIMES THAT HE SAYS HE'S DONE TESTS. 
THE COURT: WHERE ARE YOU GOING WITH THIS? 
MR. WALLENTINE: THE QUESTION, YOUR HONOR, IS 
ACTUALLY DESIGNED TO ELICIT A RESPONSE WITH RESPECT TO ON HOW 
MANY OCCASIONS IN THIS 39 TIMES HAS THERE BEEN SOME SORT OF A 
FOLLOW-UP VERIFICATION OF WHETHER THE PERSON, IF THE PERSON 
SUBMITTED TO A BLOOD TEST OR URINE TEST, SO THAT WE CAN THEN 
BEGIN TO BUILD A FOUNDATION THAT MR. WILLIAMS WAS LOOKING FOR; 
THAT OBVIOUS FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS WILL BE, HOW MANY TIMES HAVE 
YOUR CONCLUSIONS, WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER A PERSON HAS BEEN 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A PARTICULAR SUBSTANCE BEEN VERIFIED BY 
THE FACT THAT THAT PERSON DID INDEED HAVE IN THEIR SYSTEM A 
MEASURE OF THAT SUBSTANCE? 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND, BUT TO WHAT ULTIMATE 
GOAL? 
MR. WALLENTINE: SHOWING HIS AMOUNT AND ACCURACY, 
YOUR HONOR, IN EVALUATING THE SUBSTANCE THAT IS AFFECTING ANY 
PARTICULAR PERSON. AND, ULTIMATELY, THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE 
THAT IF HE WERE ABLE TO ACCURATELY IDENTIFY THE SIGNS OF A 
PERSON BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MARIJUANA OR 
METHAMPHETAMINE, OR COCAINE, IF HE REACHED A CONCLUSION AS TO 
WHAT THIS DEFENDANT WAS INFLUENCED BY THAT EVENING,' HE COULD 
OFFER HIS OPINION WITH RESPECT TO WHAT THAT SUBSTANCE WAS THAT 
WAS AFFECTING THIS DEFENDANT. 
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MR. WILLIAMS: AGAIN, MY RESPONSE, YOUR HONOR, IS 
THERE IS NOTHING STATUTORY. THERE IS NOTHING, NO WAY TO 
MEASURE THE ISSUE OF UNDER THE INFLUENCE VERSUS ANY PARTICULAR 
DRUG HAPPENING TO BE IN THE SYSTEM OR NOT. I DON'T THINK THIS 
WITNESS HAS THE EXPERTISE TO SAY THAT ANY CERTAIN INDICATION 
OF QUANTITY OR EVEN THE PRESENCE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN A PERSON'S BLOOD CORRELATES TO BEING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE. AND THAT'S THE ISSUE. 
MR. WALLENTINE: AND I THINK HE'S ACTUALLY FAIRLY 
ACCURATE ON THAT POINT, YOUR HONOR. THIS PARTICULAR 
DEFENDANT, THE REPORT THAT YOU HAVE BEFORE YOU HAD, BETWEEN 
METHAMPHETAMINE AND AMPHETAMINE, IN HIS BLOOD ONE MICROGRAM 
PER MILLILITER. IF YOU WERE TO LOOK AT THAT IN A COSMIC SENSE 
OF QUANTITY, THAT'S A SMALL, SMALL QUANTITY. AND I HAVE TRIED 
IT ON OTHER OCCASIONS, YOU ARE NOT GOING TO GET ANY EXPERT TO 
COME INTO COURT HERE AND SAY THAT, WELL, THAT SHOWS A DEGREE 
OF IMPAIRMENT THAT IS EQUIVALENT TO A POINT 2-0. YOU MIGHT 
GET SOMEONE TO COME IN AND SAY THAT'S A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OR 
THAT'S A FAIR AMOUNT. BUT IT'S NOT A SCIENCE LIKE ALCOHOL. 
HOWEVER, THE COURT NEED NOT WONDER BLINDLY IN THIS ISSUE OF 
INFLUENCE OF DRUGS THAT ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT THE COURT CAN 
EXAMINE, SHOULD EXAMINE, MUST EXAMINE WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER 
THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS TO A DEGREE 
THAT RENDERED HIM INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING A VEHICLE, IS 
WHETHER THE SIGNS OF THAT DRUG USE WERE SUFFICIENTLY MANIFEST 
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THAT THEY COULD BE EVALUATED BY A DRUG RECOGNITION EVALUATOR. 
AND THAT'S WHERE WE ARE HEADED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, I'M GOING TO VIEW THIS, I 
GUESS, AS A QUESTION OF WEIGHT AS WELL. BUT WITH THE 
ADMONITION THAT I AM WONDERING WHERE YOU WERE GOING, I'LL 
QVERRULB^ THE OBJECTION AND ALLOW YOU TO CONTINUE. 
Q (BY MR. WALLENTINE) DEPUTY, LET ME RETURN TO THE 
SAME QUESTION. DO YOU REMEMBER WHAT THE QUESTION WAS? 
A NO. YOU GO AHEAD. 
Q YOU SAID YOU PERFORMED APPROXIMATELY 39 OF THESE. 
AND HOW MANY OF THOSE TIMES HAVE YOU HAD YOUR RESULTS, YOUR 
CONCLUSIONS, HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THEM CHECKED BY A 
TOXICOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SUBJECT'S BLOOD? 
A ON ALL BUT FOUR. 
Q ON ALL BUT FOUR? SO ROUGHLY 90% OF THE TIME? 
A ON THE FOUR THAT I DID NOT ASK FOR URINE AND BLOOD 
SPECIMENS, I DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT 
IMPAIRMENT TO JUSTIFY THE COST. THE CAUSE OF THE MINIMAL 
AMOUNT OF IMPAIRMENT MIGHT BE DUE TO SLEEP DEPRIVATION, FOR 
EXAMPLE. 
Q FAIR ENOUGH. AND IN, THOSE INSTANCES, IN THOSE 
EVALUATIONS WHERE YOU HAVE HAD BLOOD OR URINE OR BOTH TAKEN, 
ON HOW MANY OCCASIONS HAVE YOU PREDICTED OR CONCLUDED A 
PARTICULAR SUBJECT TO BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE AND HAD YOUR CONCLUSION VERIFIED- THROUGH A 
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TOXICOLOGICAL TEST? 
A ALL OF THEM. 
MR. WILLIAMS: YOUR HONOR, AND THAT'S AT LEAST THE 
WAY THAT QUESTION WAS PHRASED. IT'S EXACTLYJWHAI_I--WAS 
OBJECTING-TO, THAT HE HAS MADE THE DETERMINATION OF 
IMPAIRMENT. AND THE QUESTION WAS, AND HOW MANY TIMES HAS THAT 
BEEN VALIDATED BY THE RESULTS. I DID NOT OBJECT TO THE 
EARLIER -n 
THE COURT: WELL, I AM NOT VIEWING THAT AS A 35 OUT 
OF 35 INDICATION OF IMPAIRMENT. 
MR. WALLENTINE: AND THAT'S NOT WHAT THE QUESTION 
WAS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: I AM UNDERSTANDING THAT TO BE THAT OF 
THE 35 CASES THAT HE SUSPECTED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, THE 
BLOOD TEST VALIDATED HIS OPINION. 
MR. WILLIAMS: AND THAT'S WHAT WAS ASKED AND 
ANSWERED IN THE PRIOR QUESTION. BASED ON YOUR RULING, I 
DIDN'T OBJECT TO THAT. BUT THE WAY THAT ONE WAS PHRASED WE 
WERE RIGHT BACK TO WHAT I WAS OBJECTING TO BEFORE. 
THE COURT: WELL, I AM NOT GOING TO --
MR. WALLENTINE: I THINK YOU HAVE THE QUESTION AND 
THE ANSWER, YOUR HONOR. I THINK YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS 
MEANT. 
THE COURT: YES, I AM GOING TO SAY THAT THE COURT 
WILL VIEW IT AS I HAVE HEARD IT, AND THE OBJECTION WILL BE 
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OVERRULED. 
Q (BY MR. WALLENTINE) IN THE COURSE OF ADMINISTERING 
THE D-R-E, IF WE CAN JUST USE THE SHORTHAND, DID YOU ASK THE 
DEFENDANT WHETHER HE HAD BEEN ILL OR WHETHER HE WAS UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ANY MEDICATIONS? 
A I DID. 
Q AND DID HE TELL YOU WHETHER HE WAS? 
A YES. LET ME REFER TO MY NOTES. I BELIEVE HE SAID 
HE HAD A COLD AND WAS UNDER ONE OR TWO COLD MEDICATIONS. HE 
DID SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN TAKING ACTIFED AND COUGH SYRUP. 
Q DID HE ALSO TELL YOU HE HAD BEEN TAKING TYLENOL? 
A POSSIBLY. I DON'T SEE IT RIGHT HERE. 
Q THE D-R-E FORM CALLS FOR A NUMBER OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL 
TESTS, INCLUDING THE ROMBERG TEST, NINE-STEP WALK AND TURN, 
FINGER TO NOSE. DID YOU RE-ADMINISTER THESE TESTS ONCE AGAIN 
AT THE JAIL? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AND WOULD YOU BRIEFLY -- AND YOU DON'T NEED TO GO 
THROUGH THE INSTRUCTIONS IF THEY ARE THE SAME INSTRUCTIONS YOU 
GAVE HIM -- TELL US HOW HE PERFORMED ON THESE PSYCHOPHYSICAL 
TESTS ONE BY ONE. 
A ONCE AGAIN, I STARTED WITH HORIZONTAL GAZE AND EYE 
STAGMUS. AND HE STILL DID NOT SHOW HORIZONTAL GAZE AND EYE 
STAGMUS. ON HIS WALK AND TURN TEST, HE MISSED HEEL ON TOE 
CONTACT ONCE ON THE RETURN AND STEPPED OFF ONCE. AND HE 
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CONCERNING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
MR. WALLENTINE: MAY I APPROACH, YOUR HONOR? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
MR. WALLENTINE: LET ME SUBMIT AT THIS POINT 
EXHIBITS 1 AND 2. AS MR. LAYMAN WAS ANXIOUS TO SET THIS TRIAL 
MORE EXPEDITIOUSLY THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITH A JURY, 
THE DELAY WITH THE JURY WAS LARGELY OCCASIONED BY THE STATE'S 
NOT BEING ABLE TO PRODUCE IN TIMELY FASHION WITNESSES FROM THE 
STATE CRIME LAB AND THE TOXICOLOGY LAB. THEY BOTH HAD 
SUBSTANTIAL COMMITMENTS FOR JANUARY AND DECEMBER. AND IN 
CONSIDERATION OF THE STATE'S AGREEMENT TO WAIVE THE JURY IN 
THIS MATTER, WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE WITNESSES FROM THE 
TOXICOLOGIST LABORATORY AND THE STATE CRIME LABORATORY NEED 
NOT APPEAR TODAY AND WILL STIPULATE TO THE REPORTS AND 
ADMISSION THEREOF IN THIS PROCEEDING. 
THE COURT: OKAY. IS THIS THE DEFENDANT'S 
STIPULATION? 
MR. WILLIAMS: WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE REPORTS CAN 
BE USED IN LIEU OF TESTIMONY OF THEM. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WALLENTINE: AND THAT ACTUALLY, PROBABLY, MOVED 
US UP A COUPLE MONTHS, YOUR HONOR, WITH RESPECT TO BEING ABLE 
TO GET THIS MATTER TRIED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I HAVE THEN STATE'S EXHIBIT 1, 
WHICH IS A TOXICOLOGY REPORT DATED 1 NOVEMBER '96. AND I HAVE 
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-- THERE ARE TWO MARKINGS. I GUESS THE PINK MARKING BY THIS 
COURT IS EXHIBIT NO. 2. 
MR. WALLENTINE: IT IS. IF YOU JUST IGNORE THOSE 
OTHER LABELS, THEY WERE FOR THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
THE COURT: EXHIBIT NO. 2 IS A THREE-PAGE DOCUMENT 
CONSISTING OF THE STATE CRIME LAB REPORT SUBSTANCE, AND IT 
LOOKS LIKE THE EVIDENCE RECEIPT PROPERTY REPORT AND SO FORTH. 
THERE IS A DOCUMENT, STATE OF UTAH CRIME LAB EVIDENCE RECEIPT 
AND PROPERTY REPORT, THE CRIME LABORATORY REPORT. THAT'S A 
TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT. ALL TOGETHER, THREE PAGES. OKAY? 
MR. WALLENTINE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. THE STATE 
FIRST CALLS DEPUTY SHAUN ABPLANALP. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
SHAUN ABPLANALP, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF, HAVING 
BEEN PREVIOUSLY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, WALLENTINE; 
Q GOOD AFTERNOON, DEPUTY. WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE 
YOUR NAME AND TELL US HOW YOU ARE EMPLOYED. 
A DEPUTY SHAUN ABPLANALP, EMPLOYED WITH THE UINTAH 
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
Q AND WERE YOU SO EMPLOYED, DEPUTY, ON AUGUST 12TH, 
1996? 
A I WAS. 
6 
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RISK THE -- AW, WHAT THE HECK, IT'S LATE. IT'S NOT THE MORMON 
PURCHASE PLAN, IT'S NOT LIKE FOOD STORAGE. I BETTER STOP 
THERE. I DON'T WANT TO GET AFIELD OF MY STIPULATION. 
MR. WILLIAMS: DOESN'T GO ANY FURTHER THAN THAT. 
IT DOESN'T GO ANY FURTHER THAN THAT. I STIPULATE TO THE 
PROFFER, NOT TO THE FACTS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. OKAY. ALL RIGHT. STATE 
RESTS. 
MR. WALLENTINE: WE DO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WILLIAMS: DEFENSE RESTS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. ARGUMENT ANYONE? AND I DON'T 
KNOW IF THE STATE'S GOING TO WAIVE OPENING OR --
MR. WALLENTINE: I USUALLY DO. AND SOMEBODY REALLY 
CRITICIZED ME FOR THAT THE OTHER DAY, MADE ME REAL UPSET ABOUT 
IT. I WILL. IT'S LATE. GO AHEAD. IT'S NOT A JURY. 
MR. WILLIAMS: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE BEFORE THE COURT 
VARYING EVIDENCE. THE COURT IS WELL AWARE OF THE STANDARD OF 
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. I WOULD POINT OUT SOME OF 
THE DEFICIENCIES IN WHAT WE HAVE AS IT RELATES TO THE VARYING 
CHARGES. 
NOW, PARAPHERNALIA CHARGE AND THE POSSESSION OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CHARGE DEPENDS ON POSSESSION, WHICH MEANS 
KNOWING ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION OR CONSTRUCTIVE DOMINION 
AND CONTROL OVER A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. UNDER THESE 
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CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ONLY EVIDENCE WHICH HAS BEEN PRESENTED BY 
THE STATE WHICH WOULD INDICATE ANY CONNECTION WHATSOEVER WITH 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WHICH WERE FOUND INSIDE THE PANTS OF 
GINA ZIEGENHIRT, STATE HAS ARGUED THAT MR. LAYMAN, IF HE DID 
INDEED SHAKE HIS HEAD BACK AND FORTH, THAT THAT WOULD BE 
INDICATIVE OF SOME KIND OF COMMUNICATION. EVEN IF IT IS, AND 
I DON'T KNOW THAT THE STATE HAS PROVED THAT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT, WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE, IT'S STILL NOT 
POSSESSION. EVEN IF HE KNEW IT WAS THERE, HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY 
DOMINION OR CONTROL OVER IT. 
SECOND THING IS THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH, THE 
STATE, I AM SURE, IS GOING TO SAY THAT THE LAB REPORT, EXHIBIT 
NO. 1, IS INDICATIVE OF MR. LAYMAN'S KNOWLEDGE IN SOME WAY AND 
SOMEHOW BE INFERRED TO PUT HIM IN POSSESSION OF THE CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS. 
NOW, AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, THE STATE 
EXPRESSLY WAIVED ANY THEORY ABOUT POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN A PERSON'S SYSTEM AS BEING A CRIME. THAT THEORY 
HAS BEEN TREATED IN DICTA AT THE APPELLATE COURT LEVEL. AND 
MRS. STRINGHAM CHOSE NOT TO EVEN PURSUE IT ON THAT THEORY. 
AND THAT'S EXPRESSLY ON THE RECORD. 
SO, A NODDED HEAD AND A LAB REPORT. WELL, THE LAB 
REPORT, I STIPULATED TO ITS ADMISSIBILITY. BUT THE LAB REPORT 
IS BASED ON A BLOOD DRAW AS SUCH WAS THE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 
COURT. I WOULD SUGGEST TO THE COURT THAT WHILE I STIPULATED 
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TO ADMISSIBILITY, THERE ARE CERTAIN FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
FOR ADMISSIBILITY WHICH ARE THERE FOR A REASON. IT IS A 
FOUNDATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR A BLOOD DRAW ON A DUI THAT THE 
BLOOD BE TAKEN BY A QUALIFIED PERSON, AND THEN DEFINES A 
QUALIFIED PERSON AS BEING A MEDICAL DOCTOR, A REGISTERED 
NURSE, OR SOMEONE WHO HAS OTHERWISE BEEN QUALIFIED BY THE 
STATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DRAWING BLOOD. 
IN THIS CASE, WE HAVE NOTHING BEFORE THE COURT 
SAYING WHO DREW THE BLOOD, WHAT THE PREPARATION WAS, WHAT THE 
STATE OF THE NEEDLE WAS, WHAT THE ANYTHING THAT WOULD RELATE 
TO EXCLUDING IMPURITIES TO INSURE THAT THE RESULTS WHICH WERE 
REACHED AT THE STATE LAB HAVE ANY DEGREE OF ACCURACY 
WHATSOEVER. THERE IS NO TESTIMONY. 
NOW, WHILE I MAY HAVE SOME IDEA BASED ON DISCOVERY 
MATERIALS, WHO DID A BLOOD DRAW, THE COURT CAN'T SPECULATE. 
AND THE STATE HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THIS IS 
RELIABLE EVIDENCE THAT CAN BE RELIED UPON WHEN WE TALK ABOUT 
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. THEREFORE, I WOULD SUGGEST 
TO THE COURT THAT THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN ANYTHING IN THAT 
BLOOD DRAW IS NONEXISTENT OR, AT LEAST, MINIMAL. THE PRIMARY 
PURPOSE AND THE AUTHORITY UNDER WHICH THAT BLOOD DRAW WAS 
MADE, WAS AN ARREST FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. AS WE 
LOOK AT THE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE CHARGE, WE ARE 
PRESENTED WITH AN INTERESTING DICHOTOMY THAT SOMETIMES WE 
COME, WE SEE BEFORE THE COURTS. AND, THAT IS, THE STATE 
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ASSERTS THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
SOMETHING. 
IN THIS CASE, I AM ASSUMING IT'S UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF DRUGS. WE HAVE AN UNRELIABLE LAB TEST WHICH WAS 
NOT, WHICH THERE IS NO PROPER FOUNDATION FOR, AS I POINTED 
OUT. THE INDIVIDUAL, AT THE TIME THAT HE WAS DRIVING, WAS 
DRIVING SAFELY. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS STOPPED AT AN EARLY 
MORNING HOUR. THE INDIVIDUAL, ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE THAT 
WE HAVE BEFORE THE COURT, HAD HAD NO SLEEP. THE INDIVIDUAL, 
NOT AT THE TIME OF DRIVING BUT, RATHER, AT SOME POINT AFTER 
THE DRIVING, AND WE NEVER COULD ESTABLISH HOW MUCH AFTER THAT, 
OFFICER DECAMP NEVER DID TESTIFY THAT HE HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF 
WHAT TIME HE TOOK HIS FIRST FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. AND HE 
DOESN'T KNOW, WE HAVE NO TESTIMONY SHOWING HOW LONG HE WAS 
THERE BEFORE HE EVEN STARTED ON THOSE TESTS. HIS TESTIMONY 
WAS BASED ON THOSE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS. THAT, AT THE TIME 
THAT HE LOOKED AT HIM HE DID NOT BELIEVE MR. LAYMAN TO BE 
CAPABLE OF SAFELY DRIVING A VEHICLE. BUT HE DID NOT GIVE US 
ANY OPINION OF WHAT MR. LAYMAN'S CONDITION WAS AT THE TIME OF 
THE DRIVING. 
OFFICER ABPLANALP, WHO SAW THE DRIVING AND SAW 
MR. LAYMAN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, DID NOT MAKE ANY NOTATIONS 
OF COORDINATION PROBLEMS, SPEECH PROBLEMS, ANYTHING THAT WOULD 
INDICATE IMPAIRMENT OTHER THAN WATERY, BLOODSHOT EYES AND A 
MOOD -- MOOD SWINGS, WATERY BLOODSHOT EYES AND, I BELIEVE IN 
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COMMON SENSE, JUDGE. YOU HAVE TO TAKE A LOOK AT SOMEBODY WHO 
PULLS OVER QUICKLY, EXECUTES A WILD HAIR TURN, PLACES HIMSELF 
IN A POSITION OF DANGER TO THE DEPUTY, CHARGES, DOES ALL OF 
THESE THINGS, EXHIBITS ALL OF THESE PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS. THEN 
YOU HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF, OKAY. COUPLE THAT WITH THE 
KNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAD METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS SYSTEM AT THE 
TIME AND COUPLED WITH THEY HAD INJECTION SITES AND ASK 
YOURSELF, JUDGE, IS THIS ALL DUE TO SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND 
COUGH SYRUP? NO. IT'S DUE TO BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU TELL MISS ZIBGENHIRT THAT SHE 
CAN LEAVE. 
MR. WALLENTINE: ACTUALLY, YOUR HONOR, I NEED TO GO 
STRAIGHTEN SOMETHING OUT. APPARENTLY, THERE IS A WARRANT FOR 
HER SHE'S BEING HELD ON --
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WALLENTINE: -- I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT. 
THE COURT: I'LL EXCUSE YOU FOR A MINUTE IF YOU 
WANT TO DO THAT. 
WELL, THERE IS A MYRIAD OF ISSUES THAT ARE BEFORE 
ME: THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE TEST, THERE IS NO REAL OBJECTIVE 
TEST FOR ONE WHO IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF METHAMPHETAMINE AS 
TO HIS OR HER ABILITY TO OPERATE MACHINERY OR MOTOR VEHICLE. 
THE ONLY THING I HAVE BEFORE ME, I DO HAVE A TOXICOLOGY REPORT 
THAT CAME IN SHOWING THERE WAS METHAMPHETAMINE AND A LOT OF 
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METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE BLOODSTREAM. I SUPPOSE THERE HAD TO BE 
EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A QUALIFIED TECHNICIAN THAT DREW THE 
BLOOD IN ORDER TO CONVICT FOR A DUI. AGAIN, THAT'S A MATTER 
OF WEIGHT. I ASSUME THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS THE BLOOD WAS DRAWN 
AT THE ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER. THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T 
HAVE THE JANITOR DO IT. SO I GUESS AS A MATTER OF WEIGHT I AM 
NOT GOING TO FIND THAT'S TOTALLY DEFECTIVE AND PROBABLY WITHIN 
THE REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION OF THE STIPULATION ANYWAY. 
SECONDLY, I THINK THE TIME FRAME, THE BLOOD DRAW TO 
THE DRIVING IS PROBABLY OKAY BASED UPON MY PUTTING TOGETHER 
THE TESTIMONY AND PATTERN OF EVENTS. I DON'T KNOW THAT 
OFFICER DECAMP SAID IN HIS OPINION THAT LAYMAN WAS NOT A SAFE 
DRIVER. ALTHOUGH, HE DID FAIRLY WELL ON SOME OF THE TESTS, 
WHAT I AM FOCUSING ON HERE IS THE IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR THAT THE 
METHAMPHETAMINE SUBSTANCE MAY CAUSE. AND, THAT IS, SOMEONE 
MAYBE MECHANICALLY COULD PERFORM A TEST AND DO FINE. MAYBE A 
FIGHTER PILOT COULD PERFORM WELL IN A SIMULATOR. BUT, GIVEN 
EXTERNAL FACTORS, BUT GIVEN ANOTHER DRIVER WHO DID SOMETHING 
STUPID, ONE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THIS STUFF IS LIKELY TO 
REACT IRRATIONALLY AND BECOME A VIOLENT DRIVER. MAYBE THE 
CONTROL OF HIS FACULTIES IS OKAY. BUT WE JUST CAN'T CONDONE 
PEOPLE DRIVING AROUND IN VEHICLES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNDER ANY OBJECTIVE SET OF FACTS. IF I 
CAN SEE THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE BOTH FROM OFFICER ABPLANALP OF 
AN AGITATED DRIVER, OF AN AGITATED, FIDGETY PERSON WHO 
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KENNETH R. WALLENTINE #5817 
Chief Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(801) 781-5436 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL CHARLES LAYMAN 
Defendant. 
STATE'S WITNESS LIST 
No. 961800254 FS 
Hon. A. Lynn Payne 
The State of Utah, by its counsel, Chief Deputy County Attorney Kenneth R. 
Wallentine, gives notice that it intends to call the following witnesses at trial: 
1. Shaun Abplanalp, Don DeCamp, DeNile Gale, Uintah County Sheriffs Office. 
2. Robert Faircloth, Vernal City Police Department. 
3. Reid Merrell, Adult Probation & Parole. 
4. Gina Ziegenhirt, c/o Russell Doncouse, 2411 Kiesel Avenue, Suite 415, 
Ogden, Utah. 
5. Relying on the representations of counsel, the State will not call criminalists, 
toxicologists or other technical witnesses with respect to the testing of defendant's bodily 
fluids and the suspected controlled substances sought to be introduced at trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of December, 1996. 
Kenneth K. Wallentine 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
I certify that I deposited a copy of the foregoing witness list to Alan Williams, 
attorney for defendant in his box at the Uintah Coujtfy-^ttorneys Office this 6th day of 
December, 1996. 
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CASE NO. 961800254 
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BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1996, 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION NOW PENDING IN THE ABOVE-NAMED 
COURT, WAS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON, 
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APPEARANCES 
FOR PLAINTIFF: KENNETH R. WALLENTINE 
CHIEF DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
152 EAST 100 NORTH 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
FOR DEFENDANT: ALAN M. WILLIAMS 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
365 WEST 50 NORTH, #W10 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
ORIGINAL 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
FEB 1 0 1997 
Marilyn M. Branch JAN 2 1 1997 
FILED 
DISTPT" COURT 
i n v - . • •••• - . u 
Clerk of the Court 
^lootm-ifi 
iC; ,x ,C
-bEFUTY 
fO 
COMMON SENSE, JUDGE. YOU HAVE TO TAKE A LOOK AT SOMEBODY WHO 
PULLS OVER QUICKLY, EXECUTES A WILD HAIR TURN, PLACES HIMSELF 
IN A POSITION OF DANGER TO THE DEPUTY, CHARGES, DOES ALL OF 
THESE THINGS, EXHIBITS ALL OF THESE PHYSICAL SYMPTOMS. THEN 
YOU HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF, OKAY. COUPLE THAT WITH THE 
KNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAD METHAMPHETAMINE IN HIS SYSTEM AT THE 
TIME AND COUPLED WITH THEY HAD INJECTION SITES AND ASK 
YOURSELF, JUDGE, IS THIS ALL DUE TO SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND 
COUGH SYRUP? NO. IT'S DUE TO BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU TELL MISS ZIBGENHIRT THAT SHE 
CAN LEAVE. 
MR. WALLENTINE: ACTUALLY, YOUR HONOR, I NEED TO GO 
STRAIGHTEN SOMETHING OUT. APPARENTLY, THERE IS A WARRANT FOR 
HER SHE'S BEING HELD ON --
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WALLENTINE: -- I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT. 
THE COURT: I'LL EXCUSE YOU FOR A MINUTE IF YOU 
WANT TO DO THAT. 
WELL, THERE IS A MYRIAD OF ISSUES THAT ARE BEFORE 
ME: THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE TEST, THERE IS NO REAL OBJECTIVE 
TEST FOR ONE WHO IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF METHAMPHETAMINE AS 
TO HIS OR HER ABILITY TO OPERATE MACHINERY OR MOTOR VEHICLE. 
THE ONLY THING I HAVE BEFORE ME, I DO HAVE A TOXICOLOGY REPORT 
THAT CAME IN SHOWING THERE WAS METHAMPHETAMINE AND A LOT OF 
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1 METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE BLOODSTREAM. I SUPPOSE THERE HAD TO BE 
2 EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A QUALIFIED TECHNICIAN THAT DREW THE 
3 BLOOD IN ORDER TO CONVICT FOR A DUI. AGAIN, THAT'S A MATTER 
4 OF WEIGHT. I ASSUME THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS THE BLOOD WAS DRAWN 
5 AT THE ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER. THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T 
6 HAVE THE JANITOR DO IT. SO I GUESS AS A MATTER OF WEIGHT I AM 
7 NOT GOING TO FIND THAT'S TOTALLY DEFECTIVE AND PROBABLY WITHIN 
8 THE REASONABLE CONTEMPLATION OF THE STIPULATION ANYWAY. 
9 SECONDLY, I THINK THE TIME FRAME, THE BLOOD DRAW TO 
10 THE DRIVING IS PROBABLY OKAY BASED UPON MY PUTTING TOGETHER 
11 THE TESTIMONY AND PATTERN OF EVENTS. I DON'T KNOW THAT 
12 OFFICER DECAMP SAID IN HIS OPINION THAT LAYMAN WAS NOT A SAFE 
13 DRIVER. ALTHOUGH, HE DID FAIRLY WELL ON SOME OF THE TESTS, 
14 WHAT I AM FOCUSING ON HERE IS THE IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR THAT THE 
15 METHAMPHETAMINE SUBSTANCE MAY CAUSE. AND, THAT IS, SOMEONE 
16 MAYBE MECHANICALLY COULD PERFORM A TEST AND DO FINE. MAYBE A 
17 FIGHTER PILOT COULD PERFORM WELL IN A SIMULATOR. BUT, GIVEN 
18 EXTERNAL FACTORS, BUT GIVEN ANOTHER DRIVER WHO DID SOMETHING 
19 STUPID, ONE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THIS STUFF IS LIKELY TO 
20 REACT IRRATIONALLY AND BECOME A VIOLENT DRIVER. MAYBE THE 
21 CONTROL OF HIS FACULTIES IS OKAY. BUT WE JUST CAN'T CONDONE 
22 PEOPLE DRIVING AROUND IN VEHICLES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
23 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNDER ANY OBJECTIVE SBT OF FACTS. IF I 
24 CAN SEE THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE BOTH FROM OFFICER ABPLANALP OF 
25 AN AGITATED DRIVER, OF AN AGITATED, FIDGETY PERSON WHO 
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1 COULDN'T HOLD STILL WHO WAS TALKING FAST, WHO HAD SYMPTOMS OF 
2 BEING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM 
3 STIMULANT, I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY OBJECTIVE WAY OR 
4 ANYTHING ELSE TO PROVE THAT HE'S AN UNSAFE DRIVER OTHER THAN 
5 TO PRESUME THAT BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT OF THE DRUG EVERY CASE 
6 MUST BE LOOKED A T INDIVIDUALLY. BUT ON THE BASIS OF THE 
7 TESTIMONY AND OF THE TEST, I AM GOING TO FIND THAT ALTHOUGH 
8 THERE WAS NO DIRECT EVIDENCE OF A BAD DRIVING PATTERN, THERE 
9 WAS ENOUGH EVIDENCE OF INTOXICATION OF METHAMPHETAMINE IN THIS 
10 CASE TO CONVINCE ME THAT HE WAS AND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN 
11 UNSAFE DRIVER. SO THAT'S THE BASIS FOR MY FINDING OF GUILTY 
12 ON COUNT 1. 
13 COUNT 2, THAT'S A HARDER CASE FOR ME. I GUESS MY 
14 FINDING THERE IS THAT THIS DEFENDANT WAS INVOLVED IN A COMMON 
15 ENTERPRISE. FROM THE TESTIMONY THAT I HAVE HEARD HERE, 
16 WHETHER HE HAD CONTRIBUTED CASH OR VEHICLE OR ACTED AS THE 
17 DRIVER, THEY ALL HAD A COMMON MISSION IN COMING TO VERNAL, AND 
18 THAT TAKEN TOGETHER WITH HIS DOMINION, WITH HIS INVOLVEMENT IN 
19 THE TRIP, WITH HIS POSSESSION OF IT IN THE MOTEL ROOM, WITH 
20 HIS APPARENT DOMINION OF IT, EVEN THOUGH THIS WITNESS, THIS 
21 OTHER WITNESS TESTIFIED THAT SHE WAS GIVEN THE METH TO HOLD BY 
22 HOBART, SHE WAS HESITANT TO TESTIFY HERE THAT THIS DEFENDANT 
23 HAD AN INTEREST IN IT. BUT I THINK IT'S OBVIOUS FROM THE 
24 JOINT ENTERPRISE THEY WERE ON THAT HE, IN FACT, HAD AN 
25 INTEREST IN IT. THE QUANTITY WAS A DISTRIBUTION QUANTITY. 
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THAT TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE SCALES AND THE PARAPHERNALIA, I 
DON'T KNOW, I GUESS THE PARAPHERNALIA, THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF 
THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD USED BOTH, AGAIN, FROM 
THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT, THE BLOOD TEST, AND THE OBSERVATIONS OF 
THE OFFICERS WHO WERE TRAINED AND IDENTIFYING PEOPLE WHOEVER'S 
HIGH ON SPEED, CONVINCE ME THAT THE PARAPHERNALIA WAS 
ACTUALLY, PROBABLY, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT USED BY LAYMAN 
ON THIS EVENING. I FIND HIM GUILTY ON ALL COUNTS AND BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD. 
THE COURT: WHAT IS YOUR PLEASURE WITH RESPECT TO 
SENTENCING, MR. WILLIAMS? 
MR. WILLIAMS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, I THINK THAT IT'S 
OBVIOUS THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE DOING THE APPEAL IN THIS WHERE 
HE'S INCARCERATED ALREADY. AND WE DISCUSSED -- I BELIEVE WE 
DISCUSSED IT BRIEFLY. I THINK HE WAIVED TIME FOR SENTENCING. 
GO AHEAD TODAY SO THAT WE CAN GET THIS UP TO THE COURT OF 
APPEALS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WALLENTINE: I DON'T THINK A PS I WOULD MAKE ANY 
DIFFERENCE --
THE COURT: I AM --
MR. WALLENTINE: --IF THAT'S EASIER FOR YOU. 
THE COURT: I AM WILLING TO IMPOSE SENTENCE TODAY 
WITHOUT A PSI IF THE DEFENDANT AGREES. 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
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